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Abstract: 
Historically, Iran has dominated the regional politics in several aspects, but after the 
Second World War, Saudi Arabia emerged as a significant player in regional politics. 
Both states have several differences; Saudi Arabia is Sunni dominated state with 
monarchical system of governance while Iran has a Shia dominated population and 
Islamic republic nature of governance. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been in a conflict 
with each other for several decades and there have been a number of issues that have 
intensified the Saudi-Iran rivalry for the several decades and created instability in the 
region. Iranian nuclear programme and capital punishment of Shia cleric by Saudi 
government have also further increased their rivalry. But, their recent enmity has had a 
drastic impact on the West Asian region. Therefore, regional conflicts have been 
becoming very complex and affecting the regional politics as well as international 
politics. The main aim of this paper is to examine the causes of Saudi-Iran rivalry and 
how does it impact on regional politics.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In the West Asian region, Saudi Arabia and Iran have occupied important positions. 
The West Asian region is also known as the birth place of three major religions of the 
world, Judaism, Christianity and Islam.ii ‚History of the region designated the terms Near-
                                                             
 
ii Muhammad Rizwan, Muhammad Arshid, Muhammad Waqar, Saira Iram, ‚From Rivalry to Nowhere: 
A Story of Iran-Saudi Ties,‛ IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science, Vol. 19, no. 9 (2014):92. 
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East and Middle-East, referring two different regions. The Near East representing the Balkans 
and the Ottoman Empire, while the Middle East covered Iran, Afghanistan, Turkestan and the 
Caucasus.‛iii After the First World War ended in 1918, the term Middle East became 
popular and gained acceptance and East, Eurocentric and West Asian region began to 
be referred by this term. The region had historically attracted travelers, intruders, and 
business men etc., given its geographic location and topography, alike. In the present 
time, the same region has become a hub of international politics and interventions, 
especially for the US. The boundaries of the region have been redefined and the 
animosity has escalated with each passing day. As the world was about to enter in to 
the 21st century, Middle East began to be referred as ‚Greater Middle East,‛ comprising 
mostly Muslim nations of North Africa, Western Asia and Central Asia. But this term 
was not used commonly.iv 
 Nevertheless, Iran and Saudi Arabia are the two most powerful countries in the 
Middle Eastern region and have been so since the Second World War ended. Both have 
had a say in the regional politics and have tried to dominate it. Saudi Arabia since its 
inception has had a monarchial system of governance. The supreme authority of the 
country is its King and the council of ministers is appointed by him. Freedom of 
expression and speech is limited to the extent where it does not collide with the 
doctrines it has set. Iran, on the other hand, was ruled by a dictator until the success of 
the Islamic revolution of 1979, whose overthrow paved way for another theocracy, 
however, with a twinge of democracy as the leader of the country is chosen via 
elections. However, the supreme leader of the country known as the Ayatollah is the 
highest authority in the country and can’t be challenged. Freedom of speech and 
expression in Iran is also limited to the same extent where it does not clash with the 
guidelines set by the State. Nonetheless, both the states have been engaged in a conflict 
to dominate the region. The equation between the states changed particularly after 
Islamic revolution in Iran.  
 
2. Roots of Saudi-Iran Rivalry 
 
The Iranian revolution led to the overthrow of a pro-western government bringing the 
revolutionaries to power. They were further propagating the need to export the 
revolution which threatened the other neighbouring sheikhdoms, in particular Saudi 
Arabia. ‚Tehran began backing Shia militias and parties abroad, and Riyadh - concerned at the 
growing influence of a newly-strident Iran - strengthened links to other Sunni governments, 
                                                             
iii Ibid, p.9.  
iv Middle East, ‚Land (Scholastic.Com)‛, accessed on, 12-02-2017, available at: 
www.Scholastic.com/teachers/article/middle-east-land  
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including the formation of the Gulf Co-operation Council.‛v During the 1980’s, tensions 
between Saudi and Iran escalated and ‚Saudi Arabia backed Iraq's Saddam Hussein, and 
after clashes at the hajj in 1987 killed hundreds of Iranian pilgrims, Saudi Arabia suspended 
diplomatic ties for three years. Another key milestone was the US-led 2003 invasion of Iraq, 
when the overthrow of Saddam Hussein saw a Shia-led government come to power in Riyadh's 
neighbour. The Arab Spring saw Iran support its ally, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, with 
the Saudis backing the opposition when popular protests turned into civil war.‛vi Nevertheless, 
the clash of ideologies along with different sectarian affiliations led to division between 
the two, although, they had managed to overcome their differences after the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, however, the civilian uprising again changed the equation between 
the two impacting the regional politics heavily.   
 The enmity between the two reached to its zenith after Iran relentlessly worked 
towards the exportation of its indigenous revolution to its neighbouring countries. Iran-
Iraq war was one such instance where the two countries had come head to head, 
though, indirectly. Iran was engaged in a direct confrontation with Iraq and the later 
was receiving all the necessary help from Saudi Arabia. Although, the war ended in a 
stalemate, however, it took a while for both the countries to mend their fences with each 
other.  
 A positive change began to be witnessed when in August 1990, Iraq invaded 
Kuwait, and Saudi and Iran both found themselves on the same platform of 
condemning the Iraqi aggression. A little later, diplomatic channels opened between 
them and soon highest state officials began paying visits to each other’s country. 
Nevertheless, the relations between the two again started to change when the US 
invaded Iraq, which saw the country’s Shia majority coming to power. Iran began to 
exploit the opportunity and in a very less time, Iran created hegemony over Iraq. 
 Iran’s intervention in Iraq did not go unnoticed in Saudi Arabia. And when the 
US withdrew from Iraq, the sectarian animosity became increasingly intense. ‚In 
subsequent years, two fundamental regional shifts had a cascading effect on overall Saudi-Iran 
relations: the U.S. war on terrorism following the 9/11 attacks, and the Arab uprisings in 
2011.”vii It had resulted in two major changes in the Middle East in which ‚the former 
removed Iraq as a major power in the Middle East, the latter destabilized Syria and Egypt—two 
                                                             
v Thom Poole, ‚Iran and Saudi Arabia's great rivalry explained,‛ BBC News, January 4, 2016, accessed on 
February 15, 2017, retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35221569  
vi Ibid.  
vii Helia Ighani, ‚Managing the Saudi-Iran Rivalry,‛ Council on Foreign Relations: Center for Preventive 
Action, October 25, 2016, accessed on February 3, 2017, retrieved from 
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Workshop_Report_CPA_Saudi_Iran_Rivalry_OR.p
df   
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historical Arab stalwarts….the elimination of these three major regional powers intensified the 
rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran.‛viii Nevertheless, the war in Syria proved to be the 
most important factor which intensified the rivalry between the two to such a level 
from where there seems to be no reversion.  
 
3. Iran and Saudi after the Syrian Uprising 
 
Tensions between the two countries escalated further as the war in Syria intensified 
endangering a region that had already been a hotbed of animosities for decades. And as 
the war acquired the shape of sectarian violence, an escalating competition for influence 
and dominance of the Middle East began. ‚That rivalry goes far beyond just words, with 
both countries backing militant groups and proxy forces throughout the region, particularly in 
Syria. Their competition is a major driver of conflict in the Middle East, including the growing 
violence along Sunni-Shia lines.‛ix  
 Saudi began to support the rebels against Bashar al-Assad. Iran, on the other 
hand, involved itself directly in the Syrian war and sent its armies to fight against what 
it thought was aggression and terrorism. Soon different organizations in-behalf of 
Bashar participated in the war supported by Iran. Bashar had been emerging victorious 
in Syria with Iranian help. This started to set alarm bells ringing in Saudi circles. 
Furthermore, the rise of ISIS was a major setback for the Saudi’s as there were 
allegations that Saudi had been channelizing money to the most vicious terrorist 
organization. This further strengthened the Iranian position internationally as it waged 
a war against the organization while fighting against the Syrian rebels at the same time.   
 Furthermore, Iran had been reeling under severe sanctions, which had crippled 
its economy, slapped against it after Iran failed to come to common terms with the west 
soon after the success of Islamic revolution. Their fight against ISIS terrorists helped 
their image to improve and their stature began to internationally. This culminated in 
the signing of nuclear deal with the US which was something highly unthinkable of a 
few years back and ‚crippling economic sanctions on Iran … [were] lifted.”x The nuclear 
deal paved way for ‚Washington and Tehran to de-conflict their interests in the region.‛xi It 
                                                             
viii Ibid 
ix Max Fisher, ‚The cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran that's tearing apart the Middle East, 
explained,‛ Vox News, January 4, 2016, accessed January 15, 2017, retrieved from 
http://www.vox.com/2016/1/4/10708682/sunni-shia-iran-saudi-arabia-war  
x BBC News, ‚Iran nuclear deal: Key details,‛ BBC News, January 16, 2016, accessed on February 3, 2017, 
retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33521655  
xi Navid Hassibi, ‚The Top 5 Reasons to Sign a Nuclear Deal with Iran,‛ The National Interest, November 
20, 2014, accessed on February 15, 2017, retrieved from 
 http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-top-5-reasons-sign-nuclear-deal-iran-11705  
Farooque Alam  
SAUDI-IRAN RIVALRY AND ITS IMPACT ON REGIONAL POLITICS
 
European Journal of Social Sciences Studies - Volume 2 │ Issue 9 │ 2017                                                                          144 
was further speculated that ‚could pave the way for the broader de-conflicting of regional 
interests, which could in turn lead to a form of sustained détente between the two.”xii 
 Additionally,  
 
 “Iranian negotiators understood well what’s been driving the U.S. president, and they 
 have used the prospect of becoming “a friend” as their best bargaining card. For over a 
 year now in small private conversations and strolls, they have been painting rosy 
 pictures of Iranian-American cooperation. The Iranian list of possibilities goes to most of 
 Washington’s principal worries about the broad Middle East. They would step up their 
 fighting alongside Iraqi troops to combat the so-called Islamic State (ISIS or ISIL) in 
 central Iraq. And they would do much more in Syria to go after the headquarters and 
 main forces that ISIS has there. They spoke of finding “solutions” to the civil war in 
 Yemen between Sunnis and Iran-backed Shiites. They raised hopes of forging better 
 relations with America’s “partners” in the Gulf. They pressed the idea of renewing the 
 cooperation they once had with the U.S. fighting the Taliban at the beginning of the 
 Afghan war‛.xiii            
  
 These developments in began to be seen as threatening developments by the 
Saudi’s. ‚A nuclear deal with Tehran, from the Saudi perspective, means two things: Iran will 
have the ability to improve its economic standing, and the capability to create a nuclear weapon - 
since the deal will only take effect for a relatively short period of time, 15 years, and will not 
destroy Iran's technical capabilities to maintain a nuclear programme. Both results would 
strengthen Iran and its allies in the region.‛xiv On the issue of nuclear deal, additionally, 
Saudi was left friendless.  
 
 “The Saudis have no allies in American politics to rally against the Obama 
 Administration, and no desire to set themselves against the other international powers 
 who signed the agreement, including their security partners France and Great Britain, 
 their fellow oil producer Russia, and their major oil customer China. . . . [Saudi’s] have a 
 more profound fear: that geopolitical trends in the Middle East are aligning against them, 
 threatening both their regional stature and their domestic security. The Saudis see an 
                                                             
xii Ibid.  
xiii Leslie H. Gelb, ‚The Real Reason Obama Did the Iran Deal,‛ The Daily Beast, July 14, 2015, accessed on 
February 15, 2017, retrieved from http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/07/14/the-iran-deal-s-
missing-ingredient.html  
xiv Al Jazeera, ‚Why Saudi Arabia and Israel oppose Iran nuclear deal,‛ Al Jazeera, April 14, 2015, accessed 
on January 15, 2017, retrieved from http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/saudi-arabia-israel-oppose-
iran-nuclear-deal-150401061906177.html  
Farooque Alam  
SAUDI-IRAN RIVALRY AND ITS IMPACT ON REGIONAL POLITICS
 
European Journal of Social Sciences Studies - Volume 2 │ Issue 9 │ 2017                                                                          145 
 Iran that is dominant in Iraq and Lebanon, holding onto its ally in Syria, and now 
 forging a new relationship with Washington—a rival, in short, without any obstacles to 
 regional dominance, and one further emboldened to encourage Shiite populations in the 
 Gulf monarchies, including Saudi Arabia, to oppose their Sunni rulers”.xv 
 
 Furthermore, Saudi Arabia’s position started to weaken. The war in Yemen 
waged by the Saudi’s against Houthis *Zaidi Shias+ was seen nothing more than their 
frustration and failure in the Middle East against Iran. Saudi was losing influence in the 
Fertile Crescent that began tell-upon their position internationally. ‚Saudi Arabia is 
losing influence throughout the Fertile Crescent to its rival Iran. While Riyadh's position versus 
Tehran has been in decline for some time, the trend is accelerating. Saudi setbacks are partly due 
to factors outside its control, but also due to inherent weaknesses in Saudi capacities.”xvi 
 
4. Impact on Regional Politics 
 
‚The escalating rift between predominantly Sunni Saudi Arabia and mostly Shiite Iran now 
threatens to increase sectarian tensions, as well as make conflicts in the region even more 
convoluted and intractable.‛xvii Saudi and Iranian rivalry had impacted the Middle Eastern 
politics in every way. The most disastrous impact of the rivalry was the way the region 
was divided into factions. Although, factions in the Middle East had existed in the past 
as well, for instance the communist bloc, liberal bloc, Islamist bloc etc. however, after 
the rivalry reached to new heights, sectarianism began to rear its ugly head in the 
region. The impact was felt all around Asia and in one of the incidents: 
  
 ‚The arrest of an Iranian official in Afghanistan in late August for “recruiting Afghan 
 Shiite fighters and sending them to Syria” illustrates how the Middle East’s Sunni-Shia 
 battle for dominance has found renewed fervor in South Asia. The Iranian official, 
 Qurban Ghalambor is a representative of Iran Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s office. 
 Afghan officials say Iran has created a new brigade of Afghan and Pakistani fighters led 
                                                             
xvF. Gregory Gause, ‚WHY THE IRAN DEAL SCARES SAUDI ARABIA,‛ The New Yorker, November 26, 
2013, accessed on January 31, 2017, retrieved from  
 http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-the-iran-deal-scares-saudi-arabia  
xvi Bruce Riedel, ‚Saudi Arabia losing ground to Iran,‛ Al Monitor, November 6, 2016, accessed December 
31, 2016, retrieved from 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/11/saudi-arabia-lose-ground-iran-iraq-lebanon-aoun-
irgc.html  
xvii  Nick Robins-Early, ‚How The Latest Saudi-Iran Feud Will Impact The Entire Middle East,‛ The World 
Post, September 1, 2016, Accessed January 15, 2017, retrieved from  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/saudi-iran-relations-feud_us_568ebf91e4b0cad15e63edb0  
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 by the  Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to help efforts to prop up Syrian dictator 
 Bashar al-Assad”.xviii   
 
 On the other hand, Iran and Saudi Arabia’s ongoing proxy war also ‚spread to 
northern Nigeria as evidenced by violent clashes between rival groups who follow the 
two main branches of Islam. Militants from the Izala Movement, who are backed by 
majority Sunni Saudi Arabia, attacked the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), which 
has ties to mainly Shia Iran.‛xix 
 Nevertheless, Iran and Saudi Arabia had been engaged in a tussle to emerge as 
the strongest contender in the region fighting for regional supremacy. West Asian 
region began to be dived into two blocs, pro-Saudi and pro-Iran. In 2015, Saudi Arabia 
announced to setup an Islamic Military Alliance to combat terrorism. According to 
many experts, the alliance was seen as a bulwark to stop the tide of Iranian influence 
although, ‚not explicitly aimed at countering Iran, the coalition includes neither Tehran nor its 
allied government in Iraq.‛xx ‚Saudi Arabia’s main regional rivals, Iran, were not included 
in the list, nor was the Shia-dominated government of Iraq or the embattled regime of 
Syria’s Bashar al-Assad.‛xxi Furthermore, Saudi began to lose ground to Iran in Syria 
and Yemen. As for Iraq, Saudi had already lost its influence among both social and 
political circles.    
 An indirect confrontation took place between Iran and Saudi Arabia when the 
latter executed a Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr on charges of creating disturbance 
and terrorism in the country. Iranian ‚protesters in Tehran attacked the Saudi embassy [and] 
ransacked and burn[t] it as Iran ignored or refused Saudi requests to protect the building. Saudi 
Arabia formally broke off diplomatic relations with Iran…saying it would cut commercial ties 
                                                             
xviii Abha Shankar, ‚The Saudi-Iran Rivalry and Sectarian Strife in South Asia,‛ The Diplomat, October 6, 
2016, accessed on January 25, 2017, retrieved from http://thediplomat.com/2016/10/the-saudi-iran-rivalry-
and-sectarian-strife-in-south-asia/  
xix The New Arab and Agencies, ‚Saudi-Iranian rivalry stokes sectarian tensions in Nigeria,‛ The New 
Arab, November 6, 2016, accessed on February 28, 2017, retrieved from  
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2016/11/6/saudi-iranian-rivalry-stokes-sectarian-tensions-in-
nigeria  
xx Samia Nakhoul, William Maclean, ‚Oman joins Saudi-led Islamic alliance: Gulf sources,‛ Reuters, 
December 28, 2016, accessed on January 26, 2017, retrieved from 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-oman-coalition-idUSKBN14H1L4  
xxi Adam Withnall, ‚Saudi Arabia assembles 34 Muslim country coalition to fight ‘terrorism’ – but there’s 
no mention of Isis,‛ The Independent, About a Year Go, accessed on January 15, 2017, accessed on 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-assembles-coalition-of-34-muslim-
countries-to-fight-terrorism-but-there-s-no-mention-of-a6773546.html  
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and ban Saudi travel to Iran as well.‛xxii On the other hand, ‚<the wars in Syria and Yemen 
can’t be stopped without an agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia. And now with those two 
powers refusing to speak to each other, the violence is likely to get worse.”xxiii  
 Nevertheless, ‚Saudi Arabia and Iran see one another as enemies, and are locked in an 
escalating competition for influence and dominance of the Middle East. That rivalry goes far 
beyond just words, with both countries backing militant groups and proxy forces throughout the 
region, particularly in Syria. Their competition is a major driver of conflict in the Middle East, 
including the growing violence along Sunni-Shia lines.‛xxiv Additionally, the rift between 
Saudi and Iran for influence ripped the Middle Eastern region apart since;  
 
 “Saudi Arabia and Iran are waging a struggle for dominance that has turned much of the 
 Middle East into their battlefield. Rather than fighting directly, they wield and in that 
 way worsen the region’s direst problems: dictatorship, militia violence and religious 
 extremism. The history of their rivalry tracks — and helps to explain — the Middle 
 East’s disintegration, particularly the Sunni-Shiite sectarianism both powers have found 
 useful to cultivate. It is a story in which the United States has been a supporting but 
 constant player, most recently by backing the Saudi war in Yemen, which kills hundreds 
 of civilians. These dynamics, scholars warn, point toward a future of civil wars, divided 
 societies and unstable governments”.xxv 
 
 Nevertheless, according to one Middle Eastern expert, who doubted ‚that any 
administration could reset the Middle East’s power struggles‛ said; ‚I do not think that 
the fundamental problem of the region…is something that either Mr. Trump [President Elect] or 
Mrs. Clinton could do that much about.”xxvi    
 
5. Conclusion  
 
Saudi Arabia and Iran have been two dominant regional powers in the Middle Eastern 
region. Both enjoyed cordial relationship prior to the 1979 Iranian revolution. Rift 
between the two began when Iran started to extend its influence in the region after its 
                                                             
xxii Max Fisher, ‚The cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran that's tearing apart the Middle East, 
explained,‛ Vox News, January 4, 2016, accessed on January 15, 2017, retrieved from 
 http://www.vox.com/2016/1/4/10708682/sunni-shia-iran-saudi-arabia-war  
xxiii Op. cit. 17. 
xxiv Ibid.  
xxv  MAX FISHER, ‚How the Iranian-Saudi Proxy Struggle Tore Apart the Middle East,‛ The New York 
Times, November 19, 2016, accessed on 25 January, 2017, retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/world/middleeast/iran-saudi-proxy-war.html?_r=0  
xxvi Ibid.  
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rebirth as Islamic republic. The rift took a toll on the region as it got plunged in to 
conflicts. First was the Iran-Iraq war in which Saudi opposed Iran and supported Iraq. 
However, after the war with Iraq ended, and Iraq trying to occupy Kuwait two years 
later, Iran and Saudi tried to mend fences with each other. Relationship began to 
improve, however, after the US led coalition’s invasion of Iraq, the equations were 
disturbed again as the new Iraq emerged as a new Middle Eastern ally of Iran. 
Nevertheless, Iran and Saudi again found themselves head to head with each other as 
the civilian uprising in Syria began and both found themselves supporting the 
opposites. Iran emerged as an important player in the regional politics since with its 
help Bashar al-Assad has managed to cling to power in Syria. However, the biggest jolt 
to Saudi Arabia came when its long standing ally, the US, sidelined Saudi and signed a 
nuclear deal with Iran which eventually led to Saudi Arabia’s weakening of position in 
the region and internationally.               
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